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osting by EAbstract Today there is a widening in digital technologies and increasing in new multimedia ser-
vices like: pay-per-view TV, interactive simulations, teleconferencing. So there is an increasing
demand for multicast communication. There is a number of security issues in multicast communi-
cation directly related to the speciﬁc nature of multicast. In this paper, we propose a new scheme for
authenticating streamed data delivered in real-time over an insecure network, and we concentrate
on the multicast authentication problem. Important requirements of multicast communication
protocols are: to perform authentication in real-time, to resist packet loss and to have low commu-
nication and computation overheads. In this paper, a new multicast authentication scheme is pro-
posed. It is suitable for real time applications. It uses the advanced encryption standard algorithm
to solve the problem of entrusted members. This scheme uses the idea of the new index number each
time the member sends certain block of packets in the multicast group.
 2011 National Authority for Remote Sensing and Space Sciences.
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In this paper, we introduce a new scheme to satisfy multicast
authentication in multicast environments. There is a numberrehlatif@gmail.com
or Remote Sensing and Space
evier B.V. All rights reserved.
tional Authority for Remote
lsevierof security issues in multicast communication directly related
to the speciﬁc nature of multicast. In this paper, we concen-
trate on the multicast authentication problem. Important
requirements of multicast communication protocols are: to
perform authentication in real-time, to resist packet loss to
have low communication and computation overheads. In this
paper, a scheme for authenticating multicast data applications
is proposed. In order to provide authentication, the proposed
scheme uses both public key signature and symmetric key func-
tions. It is based on the idea of dividing the stream into blocks
of m packets. The proposed scheme resists packet loss by using
erasure code functions over the signature. To resist pollution
attacks, our scheme computes the symmetric encryption of
the erasure code output. To resist replay attacks, a new index
is used for each new block of data packets. The proposed
scheme is compared to other multicast authentication
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has the following advantages: ﬁrst, it has low computation
and communication overheads. Also, it has reasonable buffer
requirements. Furthermore, it resists packet loss, pollution
and replay attacks. The proposed protocol is analyzed using
BAN logic. The analysis shows that it achieves the authentica-
tion goals in multicast communication.
2. Prior work
For multicast source authentication schemes, there are two ap-
proaches: design more efﬁcient signature schemes (Wong and
Lam, 1999; Gennaro and Rohatgi, 1997; Golle and Moda-
dugu, 2001; Perrig et al., 2001; Karlof et al., 2004) and amor-
tize the signature over several packets (Reyzin et al., 2002;
Perrig, 2001). For the ﬁrst approach, we have a technique
called BIBA (Perrig, 2001) proposed by Perrig. Perrig
proposed a one-time signature and broadcast authentication
protocol. It has a low veriﬁcation overhead and a relatively
small signature size. BIBA enhances the computation over-
head, but its communication overhead is still large. Reyzin
and Reyzin (Karlof et al., 2004) proposed a one-time signature
scheme, which is faster than BIBA and has a slightly lower
communication overhead. The two schemes are unsuitable
for real-time applications for their large communication over-
head. For the second approach, that is to amortize the signa-
ture over several packets, we have an efﬁcient scheme that
has been proposed by Wong and Lam (Wong and Lam,
1999). Although this scheme overcomes the computational
problem, it suffers from the communication overhead prob-
lem. Wong and Lam proposed the construction of hash trees
in a scheme that can authenticate received packet in a block
no matter how many packets are lost. This technique divides
the stream of data packets into blocks of m packets
(P1,P2,P3, . . . ,Pm2,Pm1,Pm) and forms a tree arrangement
of degree 2 to perform authentication as shown in Fig. 1. Each
block of certain number of messages can be authenticated with
one signature. Each leaf node is a message digest of a data
packet, and the parent nodes are message digests of the two
children nodes. The root node is the message digest for the
block, which is signed once for the entire group. To verify
the packets, the receiver recreates the path from the received
packet up to the root, computes the digest of each node, andFigure 1 Tree chaining of Wong and Lcompares the computed root to the signed received root.
Therefore, the sibling of each node along the packet’s path
must be sent to help the receiver to authenticate the packet.
Although this work solves the problem of packet loss, it has
a big problem that it needs high computation and communica-
tion overheads. Ritesh Mukherjee proposed the symmetric
message authentication scheme (Mukherjee and William At-
wood, 2007): This scheme is based on symmetric message
authentication codes (MACs) to add the required data source
authentication and data integrity check to secure the group
communication. It uses asymmetric encryption, and a symmet-
ric MAC.
To provide authentication, a symmetric key is shared
among all group members. This symmetric key is a unique
shared secret used for authentication. Every time a sender
wants to send a message to the group, it adds an index to
the packet, a counter ‘‘c’’ and a random number ‘‘k’’. The in-
dex is a number assigned by the group manager to a particular
sender for uniquely identifying it during a multicast session. It
then encrypts the packet with the asymmetric encryption key,
and then it calculates a MAC on the ciphertext using the
symmetric key. After that it attaches ‘‘k’’ and the MAC to
the packet. The packet structure is shown in Fig. 2. Finally,
LAR (Abdellatif et al., 2011) scheme provides authentication
but after considering the group members are honest. It uses
both public key signature and symmetric key functions. It is
based on the idea of dividing the stream into blocks of m pack-
ets. The sender applies the digital signature on the group key
Kg. The sender applies the erasure code function on the signa-
ture. The output of the erasure code function is partitioned
into m symbols: S1,S2,S3, . . . ,Sm. LAR scheme resists packet
loss by using erasure code functions over the signature. LAR
computes the symmetric encryption of the erasure code output.
A counter number is added to each packet as shown in Fig. 3.
LAR satisﬁes less communication overhead compared to the
other protocols used in real time applications.
3. New multicast authentication protocol for entrusted members
In this section, a description of the new protocol is detailed.
The main target in our protocol is to minimize the computa-
tion and communication overhead of multicast communica-
tion protocols, while maintaining the same security services.am scheme (Wong and Lam, 1999).
Figure 2 Packet structure of Ritech Mukherjee scheme
(Mukherjee and William Atwood, 2007).
Figure 3 LAR protocol (
New multicast authentication protocol for entrusted members using advanced encryption standard 123The sender in LAR protocol uses the AES encryption function
to encrypt only the output of the erasure code function. The
output symbol Si = (S/m); where S is the output of the erasure
code function, and m is the number of symbols of the erasure
code function. If we assume that:
1. m= 128.
2. The used algorithm is RSA, which its output is about 128
bytes.Abdellatif et al., 2011).
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cipher with block size = 16 or 24 or 32 bytes according to our
choice. For AES with 16 input bytes only, AES encrypts 16
bytes of plain data to 16 bytes of cipher data. In LAR proto-
col, padding is added to complete the input plain from 1 byte
to 16 bytes. The proposed protocol instead of adding padding
encrypts the input packet of data Pi and the erasure code func-
tion output symbol Si concatenated as a unique input plain.
This gives more security strength to the sent message and low-
ers the communication overhead, because the sender will send
the output of the encryption function only without sending the
data packet and the output of the symmetric encryption oper-
ation separately as in LAR (Abdellatif et al., 2011). All the
processes in our protocol are in series, while the processes in
LAR are in parallel. So we can say that the complexity of
the protocol decreased with less communication overhead by
about 2 bytes. All the procedure of the protocol will be
described in detail in the following:
At the sender side: The stream is divided into blocks of m
packets (P1,P2,P3, . . . ,Pm2,Pm1,Pm). The sender applies
the digital signature on the index number. This index number
is used for only one time per user. The receiver in the group
instead of saving the counter number as in LAR protocol to
use it as a fresh number saves the index with the identity of
the sender. The sender is identiﬁed by his or her digital signa-
ture, so the receiver can easily check who used this index
before. The digital signature is done by any public key system
like RSA (Stallings, 2003). So we can say that the index num-
ber has two functions:
1. It is used as a fresh number to prevent replay attack.
2. It is used to satisfy the authenticity; even if there is an
entrusted member in the group he/she cannot use it again,
because the index with the identity of the sender is stored in
the data base of other members.
The sender applies the erasure code function on the signa-
ture. The output of the erasure code function is partitioned
into m symbols: S1, S2, S3, . . . ,Sm as shown in Fig. 4. Assume
the erasure code function can resist packet loss of rate loss R.
Each time the sender wants to send a message to the group, he
must assign a new index number. Then the sender concatenates
the output of the erasure code function S1, S2, S3, . . . ,Sm with
the corresponding packet. Then the sender encrypts the output
of the concatenation operation using the symmetric system
AES (Daemen et al., 1998) by the group key kg. Then, the
sender calculates the UMAC (Black et al., 1999) value of the
output of the encryption operation. This last operation will re-
sult also m symbols that will be appended with the m output
symbols from the symmetric encryption operation. The use
of MAC algorithm has the same security strength as hash func-
tions with lower output length (Stallings, 2003). Here, we use
UMAC algorithm. As a brief description of the MAC and
the UMAC algorithm: the MAC algorithm does not need to
be reversible, as it must for decryption. In general, the MAC
function is a many-to-one function. The domain of the func-
tion consists of messages of some arbitrary length, whereas
the range consists of all possible MACs and all possible keys.
If an n-bit MAC is used, then there are 2n possible MACs,
whereas there are N possible messages with N 2n. Further-
more, with a k-bit key, there are 2k possible keys (Stallings,
2003). A MAC is generated by a function C of the formMAC= CK(M); whereM is a variable-length message, K is
a secret key shared only by sender and receiver, and CK(M) is
the ﬁxed-length authenticator (Stallings, 2003).
Here we use UMAC algorithm: UMAC has the following
features
 It has two inputs: the data packet, and a key.
 It has an output length, equals to 32 bits.
 Now, the sender output will be: the result of the encryption
operation appended with the UMAC results.
At the receiverside: Each received packet P0i contains the fol-
lowing data: the output of the Encryption function and the
corresponding output of the UMAC function. Upon receiving
the stream, each receiver has the ability to authenticate the
packets by computing the UMAC function, if equal the same
received UMAC symbol, this implies that the received packet
has been sent by one of the group members. If the two values
are different, this implies that the received packet is corrupted
and it is discarded with no need to make the decryption oper-
ation as in LAR protocol. So the new proposed protocol low-
ers the computation overhead. In case the two values are equal
the receiver makes the decryption operation and stores the re-
ceived packets in a buffer of length m for example. The receiver
can calculate the authentication information using the erasure
decode function, after receiving m(1  R) correct packets. The
proposed scheme is characterized by the following: ﬁrst the
system uses UMAC to add data source authentication and
integrity check to secure group communication. This means
that it overcomes the pollution attacks problem. Second the
digital signature is distributed along the data packets after
applying the erasure code function on it so the system avoids
the problem of signature loss and sending the signature more
than one time. The system has a resistance to packet loss as
long as it is below a certain loss rate R. the system satisﬁes con-
ﬁdentiality by encrypting the data packet. Finally; its compu-
tation overhead for m packets is calculated from the
processing of one erasure code function, one signature over
m packets, the computation of m symmetric encryption, and
the computation of m UMACs. In the next section, compari-
son of the proposed scheme with some selected protocols is de-
tailed.
4. Comparison with other protocols
We select some protocols that also support the real time com-
munication, which are suitable in the case of most internet
applications, they are Wong–Lam (Gennaro and Rohatgi,
1997), Ritesh Mukherjee (Abdellatif et al., 2011), and LAR
(Wong and Lam, 1999) schemes. In order to perform the com-
parison, we consider the following general deﬁnitions:
 The stream of data is divided into blocks; each block con-
sists of m packets, Packetlen: is the length of the packet,
Hout: is the length of the hash function, Sig: is the signature
length, E: is the erasure code function, SymE: represents
one symmetric encryption operation, KeyLen: key length,
SymD: represents one symmetric decryption operation,
PubD: represents one public decryption operation, PrivE:
represents one private encryption operation, PubE: repre-
sents one public encryption operation, PrivD: represents
one private decryption operation, EncLen: the length of
Figure 4 The new proposed protocol.
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MAC: the length of the MAC, UMAC: the length of the
UMAC, R: the rate loss. The encryption length ‘‘EncLen’’
is equal to the packet length and RN: a random number.In
the following, calculations of computation overhead at both
the sender and the receiver are derived. Also, calculations of
the communication overhead and delay at both sender and
receiver are given.
 Table 1 illustrates that all the compared protocols have a
delay at the receiver equals to m(1  R) packets except
Wong–Lam and Ritesh Mukherjee have a delay equal to
zero. This means that all the mentioned protocols are appli-
cable for real time applications.
 To compare the computation overhead at the sender of the
four presented protocols we will exclude the Ritesh Muk-
herjee protocol from the comparison. The last one uses pub-
lic encryption m times per block of m packets, which makesthe computation overhead so large than other protocols.
The Wong–Lam protocol has the lowest computation over-
head compared to LAR and the presented protocol,
because computation of two hash functions is smaller than
the computation of one symmetric encryption operation,
one erasure code function, and one UMAC operation. As
we can see from the table the computation overhead at
the sender for LAR and the presented protocol are the
same.
 From Table 1, the proposed protocol has a low computa-
tion overhead at the receiver side in case of the discarded
packet, which is considered a very important feature in real
time communication. LAR makes symmetric decryption
process at the receiver side for each received packet even
if it will discard this packet; which consumes time. The pro-
posed protocol solves this problem by applying UMAC
operation after the symmetric encryption operation.
Table 1 Comparison between Wong–Lam, Ritesh Mukherjee, LAR and the proposed protocol.
Wong–Lam Ritesh Mukherjee LAR The proposed
protocol
Computation
overhead at
sender
PrivE+ (2m  1)*H mPubE+ mMAC mUMAC+ E+ SymE+ PrivE mUMAC+ E+ SymE+ PrivE
Computation
overhead at
receiver per
packet
PubD+ (log2m  1)*H PrivD+MAC SymD+ UMAC+ PubD/m SymD+ UMAC+ PubD/m
Communication
overhead/packet
(log2m+ 1)*Hout+ Sig MAC+ countlen+ 2*RN UMAC+ EncLen*(1 + R) +
countlen+ packetlen
UMAC+ EncLen*(1 + R)
Delay:
–At the sender m 0 m m
–At the receiver
(assume no
packet is lost)
0 0 m(1  R) m(1  R)
Computation at
the receiver
(in case the
packet will be
discarded)
PubD+ log2m  1*H MAC SymD+UMAC+ UMAC
Table 2 Communication overhead per packet in bytes.
Wong–Lam LAR Ritesh Mukherjee Proposed protocol
Communication Overhead 256+ packetlen 22+packetlen+countlent 41+packetlen 22
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make a computation of one MAC or UMAC at the receiver
in case of the discarded packet, but Ritesh Mukherjee has a
high communication overhead as will be detailed in Table 2.
 Most of the presented schemes have a resistance against
packet loss; the proposed protocol solves this problem by
using the erasure code function. Our scheme can restore
the lost packets as long as the loss rate is under certain loss
rate R. Wong and Lam protocol has a low computation
overhead at sender, and a resistance against any packet loss,
but it has a very high communication overhead and a larger
computation overhead at receiver compared to the
proposed protocol. Because, Wong and Lam makes compu-
tation of one public decryption for each received packet,
while our protocol makes it once for the whole block of
m packets.
Table 2 shows a numerical comparison of communications
overhead between: Wong–LAM, Ritesh Mukherjee, LAR and
the proposed protocol. In Table 2, The following parameters
are assumed: m= 128 packets, Hout = 16 bytes (assuming
MD5 algorithm), Sig = 128 bytes (assuming RSA algorithm
[22]), UMACout = 4 bytes (assuming UMAC algorithm),
counlent: the length of the counter, EncLen = 16 bytes (assum-
ing Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm (AES) (Daemen
et al., 1998)), MAC= 8 bytes, Keylen = 16 bytes, Packetlen:
the length of the packet, and RN= 16 bytes, R= 0.1.
From Table 2, proposed protocol has a lowest communica-
tion overhead compared to other schemes.5. Conclusions
Nowadays, Multicast communication becomes a very impor-
tant ﬁeld. There are many topics of research in this ﬁeld, which
have many alternatives and challenges. Its importance is a lo-
gic result after its wide applications, but because of its proper-
ties, its security becomes somehow hard. A new multicast
group authentication protocol was presented. The proposed
scheme can resist packet loss, pollution attacks; replay attack.
To evaluate the performance of our new scheme, we compare
our protocol with some other previously proposed schemes,
which are suitable for real time applications. they are Wong–
Lam, Ritesh Mukherjee, and LAR schemes. The proposed
scheme can resist pollution attacks, packet loss, and replay
attack as LAR with lower computation and communication
overheads compared to LAR and known multicast authentica-
tion schemes. The computation overhead at the sender for
LAR and the presented protocol is the same. The new
proposed protocol lowers the computation overhead in case
of receiving rejected packets. The presented protocol lowers
also the communication overhead by: (1) using the idea of
the index number, (2) inserting the data packet into the sym-
metric encryption operation with no additional computation
overhead. Veriﬁcation to the presented protocol is made using
BAN logic. The veriﬁcation results show that the protocol
satisﬁes the authentication between sender and receiver in case
of multicast. The analysis shows that the presented protocol is
free from redundancy and free from any types of known
attacks like: replay attack or pollution attack.
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In this section, logical analysis of proposed protocol is de-
tailed. We have used Burrows, Abadi; and Needham (BAN)
logic (Levente et al., 1998) to validate our model. This is done
using logics developed speciﬁcally for the analysis of knowl-
edge and belief. The analysis of our protocol is performed as
follows:
 Assumptions about the initial state are given.
 Description of the protocol using Logical formulas is
written.
 The logical formulas are applied to the assumptions and
description formulas, in order to discover the beliefs held
by the parties in the protocol.
We will assume that we have a group G that consists of the
members: A, B, C, D, . . . We will take A and B as an example
to prove the authentication operation. We can represent the
protocol in one step. The following formula for describing
the operation of the protocol:
Message A! B : fH E Pi; fIgK1a
  
;E Pi; fIgK1a
 
gKg ð1Þ
where
A: User A
B: User B
Pi: indicates the data packet number i
ci: indicates the counter number i
Kg: the group key
K1a : private key of A
I: the index number
fIgK1a indicates the digital signature. E Pi; fIgK1a
 
indi-
cates the AES encryption of the data packet concatenated with
the digital signature.
H E Pi; fIgK1a
  
indicates the UMAC of the AES encryp-
tion of the data packet concatenated with the digital signature.
We will consider the multicast authentication is completed be-
tween principles A and B, if there is a data packet ‘‘X’’ which
the receiver B believes that it is sent by A. Thus authentication
between A and B will be completed if: BŒ ” AŒ ” X, BŒ ” X;
where the symbol Œ” means believes.
Now, we transform the protocol as the following:
Message A! B : H Pi; f#IgK1a
n o
kg
 
;

 Pi; ;f#IgK1a
n o
kg

kg
ð2Þ
The initial assumptions are given by
Aj  !Ka A ð3Þ
Bj  !Ka A ð4Þ
Bj  A$Kg B ð5Þ
Bj  Aj ) Pi ð6Þ
Bj  #I ð7Þ
Bj  Aj ) I ð8Þ
Eq. (3) indicates that A believes that Ka is the public key of A,
Eq. (4) indicates that B believes that Ka is the public key of A,Eq. (5) indicates that A and B share the key Kg, Eq. (6) indi-
cates that B believes that A has jurisdiction over Pi, Eq. (7)
indicates that B believes that I is fresh, Eq. (8) indicates that
B believes that A has jurisdiction over I.
Using Eqs. (2) and (5) and applying the message meaning
rule (Levente et al., 1998), we obtain:
Bj  A;C;D; . . . j
 H Pi; fIgK1a
 
kg
 
; Pi; fIgK1a
 
kg
 
ð9Þ
Using Eq. (9) and applying the interpretation rule (Levente
et al., 1998), we obtain:
Bj  A;C;D; . . . j  Pi; fIgK1a
 
kg
ð10Þ
Bj  A;C;D; . . . j  H Pi; fIgK1a
 
kg
 
ð11Þ
Form Eqs. (10) and (5) by applying the message meaning rule
we can say:
Bj  A;C;D; . . . j  Pi; fIgK1a
 
ð12Þ
From Eq. (12) and by applying the interpretation rule we can
say:
Bj  A;C;D; . . . j  ðPiÞ ð13Þ
Bj  A;C;D; . . . j  fIgK1a
 
ð14Þ
From Eqs. (14) and (4) and by applying message meaning rule
we can say:
Bj  Aj  I ð15Þ
We will assume that Eq. (15) is used as an index for the rest of
the group to know the identity of the sender, and by assuming
that the entire group is honest we can put the following for-
mula assuming the group members are honest:
Bj  Gj  HðX;YÞ;Bj  Aj  X
Bj  Aj  Y ð16Þ
where
G: is a certain group in a multicast communication session.
A: is the intended sender.
B: certain receiver from the group.
X,Y: the sent data.
From Eq. (16) and by using Eqs. (10) and (11) we can say:
Bj  Aj  ðPi; IÞ ð17Þ
From Eq. (7) and by applying the freshness rule (Levente et al.,
1998), we obtain:
Bj  #ðPi; IÞ ð18Þ
From Eqs. (17) and (18) and by applying the nonce-veriﬁca-
tion rule (Levente et al., 1998), we obtain:
Bj  Aj  ðPi; IÞ ð19Þ
Using Eq. (19), and from (Burrows et al., 1990):
Bj  Aj  Pi ð20Þ
Using Eqs. (6) and (18) and by applying the jurisdiction rule
(Levente et al., 1998), we can get:
128 R.A. AbouhogailBj  Pi ð21Þ
From Eqs. (20) and (21), we deduce that: the proposed proto-
col achieves its goals, and it is free from redundancy, and it is
free from any type of known attacks like: replay attacks, mes-
sage modiﬁcation, insertion, or deletion.
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